Chinese-linked hackers operated a backdoor in popular source and text code editor Notepad++ for more than six months sideloading persistent malware, according to security researchers.

Open source Windows-based code editor Notepad++ said independent researchers had pointed the finger at China for the attack, which targeted the update process for specific users from June until December 2, 2025.

In a blog post dated February 2, Notepad++ developer Don Ho said: “The compromise occurred at the hosting provider level rather than through vulnerabilities in Notepad++ code itself. Traffic from certain targeted users was selectively redirected.”

A CISA spokesperson told Reuters, the agency "is aware of the reported compromise and is investigating possible exposure across the United States Government (USG)."

Redirecting update traffic

The backdoor issue affected traffic to the Notepad++ updater WinGUp. Targeted users attempting to update the popular code and text editor were redirected to malicious servers that prompted them to download an illegitimate Notepad++ update binary.

Research by cybersecurity firm Rapid7 found the download included an NSIS installer which sideloaded a malicious DLL and encrypted shellcode for the installation of the backdoor, dubbed "Chrysalis."

The attackers had access to the hosting server used for Notepad++ updates from June 2025 until December 2, 2025. Rapid7 attributes the attack with "moderate confidence" to Lotus Blossom.

Ivan Feigl, author of the Rapid7 blog, said the "sophisticated and permanent tool" used legitimate binaries to sideload the DLL, custom API hashing, layered obfuscation, and structured C2 communication.

Attacks and remediation

Once fully activated, Chrysalis established an internet connection with a user agent and C2 api.skycloudcenter.com to transfer data.

Notepad++ had first raised the issue in December after it received reports of traffic hijacking, it patched WinGUp’s security practices to verify the certificate and signature of the downloaded installer and has migrated to a new hosting provider “with significantly stronger security practices.”

The Notepad++ team initially said on Monday they had not been able to identify clear IoCs for the attack, "While signs of an intrusion were identified, no concrete indicators of compromise (...) We also requested IoCs directly from the former hosting provider, but we were not able to obtain any."

Rapid7's more in depth investigation shared file indicators, network indicators and MITRE TTPs, however the researchers concurred that "no definitive artifacts were identified to confirm exploitation."

Notepad++ IoCs

File indicators

update.exe

a511be5164dc1122fb5a7daa3eef9467e43d8458425b15a640235796006590c9

[NSIS.nsi]

8ea8b83645fba6e23d48075a0d3fc73ad2ba515b4536710cda4f1f232718f53e

BluetoothService.exe

2da00de67720f5f13b17e9d985fe70f10f153da60c9ab1086fe58f069a156924

BluetoothService

77bfea78def679aa1117f569a35e8fd1542df21f7e00e27f192c907e61d63a2e

log.dll

3bdc4c0637591533f1d4198a72a33426c01f69bd2e15ceee547866f65e26b7ad

u.bat

9276594e73cda1c69b7d265b3f08dc8fa84bf2d6599086b9acc0bb3745146600

conf.c

f4d829739f2d6ba7e3ede83dad428a0ced1a703ec582fc73a4eee3df3704629a

libtcc.dll

4a52570eeaf9d27722377865df312e295a7a23c3b6eb991944c2ecd707cc9906

admin

831e1ea13a1bd405f5bda2b9d8f2265f7b1db6c668dd2165ccc8a9c4c15ea7dd

loader1

0a9b8df968df41920b6ff07785cbfebe8bda29e6b512c94a3b2a83d10014d2fd

uffhxpSy

4c2ea8193f4a5db63b897a2d3ce127cc5d89687f380b97a1d91e0c8db542e4f8

loader2

e7cd605568c38bd6e0aba31045e1633205d0598c607a855e2e1bca4cca1c6eda

3yzr31vk

078a9e5c6c787e5532a7e728720cbafee9021bfec4a30e3c2be110748d7c43c5

ConsoleApplication2.exe

b4169a831292e245ebdffedd5820584d73b129411546e7d3eccf4663d5fc5be3

system

7add554a98d3a99b319f2127688356c1283ed073a084805f14e33b4f6a6126fd

s047t5g.exe

fcc2765305bcd213b7558025b2039df2265c3e0b6401e4833123c461df2de51a

Network indicators

95.179.213.0

api[.]skycloudcenter[.]com

api[.]wiresguard[.]com

61.4.102.97

59.110.7.32

124.222.137.114

MITRE TTPs

ATT&CK ID

Name

T1204.002

User Execution: Malicious File

T1036

Masquerading

T1027

Obfuscated Files or Information

T1027.007

Obfuscated Files or Information: Dynamic API Resolution

T1140

Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

T1574.002

DLL Side-Loading

T1106

Native API

T1055

Process Injection

T1620

Reflective Code Loading

T1059.003

Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell

T1083

File and Directory Discovery

T1005

Data from Local System

T1105

Ingress Tool Transfer

T1041

Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

T1071.001

Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols (HTTP/HTTPS)

T1573

Encrypted Channel

T1547.001

Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys

T1543.003

Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service

T1480.002

Execution Guardrails: Mutual Exclusion

T1070.004

Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion

*IOCs contributed by @AIexGP on X.

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